David Hume’s theory of action is well known for several provocative theses, including that passion and reason cannot be opposed over the direction of action. In Hume, Passion, and Action, the author defends an original interpretation of Hume’s views on passion, reason and motivation that is consistent with other theses in Hume’s philosophy, loyal to his texts, and historically situated. This book challenges the now orthodox interpretation of Hume on motivation, presenting an alternative that situates Hume closer to “Humeans” than (...) many recent interpreters have. Part of the strategy is to examine the thinking of the early modern intellectuals to whom Hume responds. Most of these thinkers insisted that passions lead us to pursue harmful objects unless regulated by reason; and most regarded passions as representations of good and evil, which can be false. Understanding Hume’s response to these claims requires appreciating his respective characterizations of reason and passion. The author argues that Hume’s thesis that reason is practically impotent apart from passion is about beliefs generated by reason, rather than about the capacity of reason. Furthermore, the argument makes sense of Hume’s sometimes-ridiculed description of passions as “original existences” having no reference to objects. The author also shows how Hume understood morality as intrinsically motivating, while holding that moral beliefs are not themselves motives, and why he thought of passions as self-regulating, contrary to the admonitions of the rationalists. (shrink)

On Hume's account, when we lack virtues that would typically prompt moral action, we can instead be motivated by the "sense of duty." Surprisingly, Hume seems to maintain that, in such cases, we are motivated by a desire to avoid the unpleasantness of "self-hatred" evoked in us when we realize we lack certain traits others possess. This account has led commentators to argue that Hume is not a moral internalist, since motivation by duty is motivation by a self-interested desire. This (...) paper concludes that Hume is indeed a moral internalist and that the motive of duty can be understood as a form of motivation by moral disapprobation in a way supported by Hume's general motivational psychology. (shrink)

Comprised of twenty-nine specially commissioned essays, _A Companion to Hume_ examines the depth of the philosophies and influence of one of history's most remarkable thinkers. Demonstrates the range of Hume's work and illuminates the ongoing debates that it has generated Organized by subject, with introductions to each section to orient the reader Explores topics such as knowledge, passion, morality, religion, economics, and politics Examines the paradoxes of Hume's thought and his legacy, covering the methods, themes, and consequences of his contributions (...) to philosophy. (shrink)

Two views of theistic faith are presented in this book. Some contributors see faith as a set of beliefs about God and seek substantiation for those beliefs. Others perceive faith less as a set of beliefs than as a special way of living in relationship to God. The connection between these two views is an intriguing theme winding through the collection and explicitly addressed by Michael A. Brown in the closing essay. The epistemology of religion is now one of the (...) most exciting and controversial areas in philosophy of religion. These eleven essays by recognized leaders in the field and outstanding new voices exhibit the diversity of approaches and the subtle unity of concerns that characterize the best work in this discipline. The repeated comparison of religious beliefs and their justification with scientific theories and their testing is especially useful. (shrink)

The eighteenth-century philosopher Francis Hutcheson contends that the morality of an agent's action or character depends on the pleasurable or painful feelings which, through the moral sense, it arouses in an observer. His is the first fully-developed "moral sense" theory in the history of ethics, and there is evidence that David Hume's moral epistemology contains the critical features of such a theory as well. Commentators on the work of these two philosophers have offered widely divergent interpretations of their theories, ranging (...) from emotivist to realist readings. In my dissertation, I examine the conflicting readings and defend my own interpretation. ;I contend that the ordinary emotivist interpretation wrongly treats Hutcheson and Hume as defending theses of mere moral sentiment--where no epistemological status is attached to the pertinent feelings--and that textual evidence militates against this and the moral realist readings . In my view, Hutcheson and Hume postulate a conscious parallel between their conceptions of secondary qualities and the treatment of moral qualities, which renders them moral subjectivists of a "mitigated" sort for whom, in virtue of their reference to standard conditions of perception, moral distinctions are contingent upon the constitution of the normal perceiver. Hume emerges here as a moral cognitivist, holding that moral judgments are beliefs, and as an emotivist of a sort, holding that these beliefs are also feelings. I attempt to reconcile this cognitivist interpretation of Hume with his claim that "ought"-conclusions cannot follow from "is"-premises and with his view that morality is essentially connected to motives. I also exhibit the unexpected differences between Hume's view of motivation and that of Hutcheson, who on my reading has it that moral distinctions and desire are only contingently related. ;Two formidable problems arise for these theories. First, particular true moral evaluations could become false with changes in the normal human perceiver, so that an agent's enduring character could be good at one time and evil at another. Second, the requirements for experiencing approval are not merely contingent as the requirements for experiencing sensations are. Despite these objections, I briefly examine to what extent human feelings may be valuable as a source of moral knowledge. (shrink)

Part of the Blackwell Readings in the History of Philosophy series, this survey of late modern philosophy focuses on the key texts and philosophers of the period whose beliefs changed the course of western thought.

This brief text assists students in understanding Hume's philosophy and thinking so that they can more fully engage in useful, intelligent class dialogue and improve their understanding of course content. Part of the "Wadsworth Philosophers Series,", ON HUME is written by a philosopher deeply versed in the philosophy of this key thinker. Like other books in the series, this concise book offers sufficient insight into the thinking of a notable philosopher better enabling students to engage in the reading and to (...) discuss the material in class and on paper. (shrink)